BEYOND DIVESTMENT



Centre for Climate Crime and Climate Justice

Corporate Watch

October 2023

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SUMMARY

- The top 20 shareholders in both BP and Shell have increased their total number of shares by three quarters of a billion in BP, and half a billion in Shell, since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015.
- Although 47% of BP shareholders and 54% of Shell shareholders have reduced their stake in Shell and BP, net share ownership has risen by 10% in both BP and Shell.
- Any trend towards divestment amongst the 47% and 54% of BP and Shell shareholders is being cancelled out by the largest shareholders, who happen to include the world's largest and most powerful asset managers.
- Moreover, what might look like divestment cannot always be read as such; more than a quarter of the 20 investors who made the most significant reductions in shareholdings in either BP or Shell actually increased their shares in the other company.
- Only 60 institutional investors have sold all their shares in the two oil firms. This represents 3% of BP and 4% of Shell shareholders.
- The enormous increase in both market capitalisation and share price for the two oil giants since the Paris Agreement reaffirms the conclusion that divestment campaigns are not having the necessary impact.
- If shareholder divestment is not working fast enough – as this report shows – then we need to pursue other forms of intervention that drastically scale back oil and gas production.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Our earlier report, **Carbon Cash Machine**, found that the cash earnings accumulated by shareholders in Britain's two largest oil companies – BP and Shell – are around triple the amount they were when the Paris Agreement was signed in December 2015. Those earnings amount to £131bn. The report further showed that a group of eight megashareholders had at the same time substantially increased their shareholding in that same period. *Carbon Cash Machine* therefore concluded that further analysis was necessary to explore patterns of divestment in BP and Shell in a follow-up report.

This report shines a light on the impact of growing demands made upon shareholders to divest from fossil fuels. Divestment campaigns seek to persuade institutions such as universities, charitable foundations, and pension funds to withdraw funds from fossil fuel companies as part of a broader range of measures necessary to address the global climate crisis.

Fossil fuel divestment campaigns in Britain gathered momentum around 2012 with the most significant impetus probably coming from student pressure to get their universities to divest. In 2014, the University of Glasgow was the first university in Europe to pledge to divest from fossil fuels.[1] A number of local authorities followed with similar pledges. In 2016, the London Borough of Waltham Forest became the first local authority in Britain to promise to fully divest from fossil fuels, which it finally achieved in 2022.[2] According to the campaign group *People and Planet*, there are now a total of 101 British universities that have committed to divest from fossil fuels in some form.[3] The Paris Agreement, signed in December 2015, had initially underlined the urgency of using investment flows to phase out fossil fuels. Article 2 c. of the Agreement in particular is often credited with giving momentum to divestment strategies. The article notes the importance of "(m)aking finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development."[4] There are a number of claims circulating about the impact the Paris Agreement has had on fossil fuel divestment, as well as the ramifications of divestment itself. For example, according to UK Divest, more than 1,500 organisations worldwide have committed to fully divesting from fossil fuels. The vast majority of those commitments have come since December 2015.[5] The end of 2015 is therefore an appropriate baseline for our exploration into the efficacy of divestment from the two largest British oil majors, BP and Shell.

Notably, BP and Shell were amongst the first companies to proclaim support for the Paris Agreement. Indeed, when Donald Trump announced the US's intent not

1. The Guardian, 8th Oct 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/08/glasgow-becomes-first-university-in-europe-to-divest-from-fossil-fuels
2. Waltham Forest Echo, 5th September 2022. https://walthamforestecho.co.uk/2022/09/05/waltham-forest-becomes-first-council-to-divest-from-fossil-fuels/
3. Figures from People and Planet. https://peopleandplanet.org/fossil-free-victories
4. UNFCC (2015) Paris Agreement, New York: United Nations, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
5. Figures from UK Divest, https://www.divest.org.uk/commitments/

to implement the Paris Agreement, Shell responded by arguing that: “It is crucial that the Paris agreement remains in place”, because “it underpins the need for the ongoing energy transition.”[6] And in BP’s latest policy statement on compliance with the Paris Agreement, it notes:

“*We support the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, which were reaffirmed at the COP26 Glasgow Climate Pact, and to achieve those goals we believe that the energy system needs to be transformed*.”[7]

Yet the oil and gas boom in the current period is giving us even less reason to accept those statements at face value. Both BP and Shell are heavily committed to exploring for new sources of oil and gas. In February 2023, BP announced a downgrading of its commitment to cut production from a target of 40% to 25% by 2030.[8] Shell is also currently in the process of considering a reversal of its target to reduce oil output by 1% - 2% per year by 2030.[9]

Greenpeace’s 2023 report *The Dirty Dozen*, notes that BP’s capital expenditure on low carbon energy (solar, wind, geothermal, hydro power and green hydrogen) was 3% of total investment and Shell’s was 9% of total investment. All other investment was spent on fossil fuels and high carbon energy sources.[10]

For all of those reasons, this is a crucial moment to examine the impact of divestment campaigns on BP and Shell, and to look at how we might be able to secure effective withdrawal of investment in fossil fuels.

This report seeks to do precisely this, by analysing investment movements in BP and Shell since the Paris Agreement was signed on 2nd December 2015. It begins with a short section on methodology which explains the data used in this report and how it is analysed, before turning to explore in detail the trends in divestment and investment in BP and Shell that have occurred since then.

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6. Reported on Shell’s digital news service Inside Energy, https://www.shell.com/inside-energy/can-paris-agreement-survive.html

7. BP Climate Policy Positions, May 2022, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/group-reports/bp-climate-policy-positions.pdf

8. Guardian, 7th February 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/feb/07/bp-profits-windfall-tax-gas-prices-ukraine-war

9. Reuters, 3rd March 2023 https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/shell-reviewing-oil-gas-output-reduction-targets-ceo-tells-times-2023-03-03/

10. Bukold, S (2023) The Dirty Dozen: the climate greenwashing of 12 European oil companies, Hamburg: Greenpeace in Zentral- und Osteuropa.

2. SOURCES AND BASELINE INFORMATION

The analysis in this report is based on the data included in the S&P Capital IQ platform. This platform compiles data relating to institutional shareholders. It therefore provides an incomplete overview, since it doesn't include individual shareholders and may exclude some forms of institutions. Whilst we can be confident that the data captures virtually all significant institutional shareholders accurately, the data set is by no means complete. We need to read the data and the analysis presented in this report with this in mind.

The S&P Capital IQ platform uses a number of published sources to compile data, including the proxy statements and annual reports of companies, as well as portfolio filings and statutory notifications to regulatory agencies and stock exchanges. In the platform, ownership data is typically reported by the number of shares each holder owns, but it may be reported as a calculated percentage of the total shares outstanding.

The sample included in this report accounts for institutional shareholders that currently own a combined 72% of BP shares (a total of 1675 shareholders) and a combined 70% of Shell shares (a total of 1903 shareholders).

This report analyses trends in the position of those shareholders between December 31st 2015 and December 31st 2022 and uses those dates as anchor points for data on share ownership, share prices and aggregate numbers of shares outstanding. In the calculations used in this report, the following baseline figures are used.

Table 1: Share price

Company	Closing share price 31st Dec 2015 (£)	Closing share price 31st Dec 2022 (£)
BP	3.76	4.75
Shell	15.18	23.26

Table 2: Shares outstanding

Company	Shares outstanding 31st Dec 2015	Shares outstanding 31st Dec 2022	Shares outstanding movement
BP	18,418,956,932	17,981,004,132	–2.4%
Shell	6,395,558,856	7,003,688,716	+9.5%

The term 'shares outstanding' refers to the company's stock – counted as the total number of shares – held by all its shareholders. As we can see from Table 2, BP has slightly reduced shares, and Shell has significantly increased its number of shares outstanding.

This is largely because of a different balance reached between share issues and buybacks in each company since 2015. In BP, this balance tips in favour of share buybacks; in Shell, it tips in the other direction, largely as a result of major share issues in 2016.

3. Profiling Investment in BP and Shell Since Paris

Table 3 sets out the market capitalisation (the value of each company based upon the total value of shares). The table clearly indicates a very steep rise in this measure for each company.

Table 3: Market capitalisation [11]

Company	Total value of shares 31st Dec 2015 (£)	Total value of shares 31st Dec 2022 (£)	% increase
BP	£69,273,697,021	£85,391,788,623	23.3
Shell	£97,084,583,434	£162,905,799,534	67.8

A rise in market capitalisation is generally seen as an index of investor confidence in the company's future prospects. A healthy, sustained, level of market capitalisation can make it easier for the company to secure loans or raise capital through share re-issues.

As we noted above, this sample includes institutional shareholders that hold 70% of shares in BP and 72% of shares in Shell. The net shareholding of those institutional shareholders has risen in both companies by 10%.

Within this group of shareholders, investment and divestment patterns correlate closely to shareholder size.

11. Market capitalisation figures in this table are derived from the data provided by Capital IQ.

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate share movement represented in different groups of shareholders ranked by their size. We have included the top 250 shareholders in this table, since they account for more than two thirds of share ownership in BP and Shell (the top 250 own 68% of shares in each company).

As those tables demonstrate, in both firms, the acquisition of shares occurs at a faster pace as we reach the largest shareholders. In both firms, the lower ranks are net divestors, whilst the higher ranks effectively ensure that net investment continues to rise.

Table 4: Distribution of share movement, BP.

BP	Net change in share ownership	Number of unknown cases[12]
Top 20	776,562,262	0
21-100	–163,370,332	11
101-250	–127,854,546	39

Table 5: Distribution of share movement, Shell.

Shell	Net change in share ownership	Number of unknown cases
Top 20	577,393,728	0
21-100	–476,706,900	12
101-250	–23,239,697	53

Tables 4 and 5 show that the top 20 shareholders in each company have increased their holding at a volume that exceeds the net divestment of the next 230 biggest investors.

This tells us that investment movements in the top 20 are crucially important to overall trends in investment/divestment. Indeed, it is clear from Tables 5 and 6 that added investment by the top 20 is more than offsetting any counter moves to divest down the ranks.

12. ‘Unknown’ cases are cases for which there is incomplete data available.

Tables 6 and 7 explore in more detail those movements in share ownership in 20 shareholders that sit at the top of the corporate hierarchy.

Table 6: BP top 20 shareholders

Shareholder	Share ownership 2022	Movement in share ownership
BlackRock Inc.	1,905,986,438	585,347,226
Vanguard Group Inc.	782,245,186	334,989,476
Norges Bank Investment Management	495,734,225	149,648,234
UBS Asset Management AG	385,683,597	–221,533,262
State Street Global Advisors Inc.	359,406,811	–97,406,192
Franklin Resources Inc.	323,288,521	161,058,487
Capital Research & Mgmt Co.	290,715,716	–113,094,836
Bp p.l.c., ESOP	255,587,726	107,122,092
SAFE Investment Co. Ltd.	254,282,821	–129,224,741
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd.	249,211,259	–400,314,919
abrdn PLC [13]	238,413,293	–43,396,748
FMR LLC	185,542,263	113,222,081
Schroder Investment Management Ltd.	173,569,083	–9,695,252
Arrowstreet Capital Ltd. Partnership	153,563,076	131,076,996
Société Générale SA	150,517,772	99,778,559
Barclays Bank PLC	146,625,529	81,929,439
Royal London Asset Management Ltd.	136,134,222	33,751,867
HSBC Global Asset Management (UK) Ltd.	125,704,956	–19,530,192
JP Morgan Asset Management	125,547,611	29,476,929
Northern Trust Global Investments	123,990,904	–16,642,982
Total	6,861,751,009	776,562,262

13. abrdn is the product of a merger between Aberdeen Asset Management and Standard Life in 2017. Aberdeen Asset Management was a major shareholder of both BP and Shell. Estimates for shareholding prior to 2017 are based on shareholding of Aberdeen Asset Management; the data held in S&P Capital IQ does not indicate a significant shareholding by Standard Life.

Table 7: Shell top 20 shareholders

Shareholder	Share ownership 2022	Movement in share ownership
BlackRock Inc.	594,613,172	113,667,14
Vanguard Group Inc.	321,470,746	101,965,234
Norges Bank Investment Management	197,126,118	60,838,098
JP Morgan Chase & Co.	181,043,737	177,650,174
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Shareview Clients	124,112,251	62,841,852
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd.	117,907,969	–87,202,850
UBS Asset Management	107,859,30	42,802,881
State Street Global Advisors Inc.	95,847,741	–78,270,657
FMR LLC	86,747,196	12,959,644
abrdn PLC	81,436,973	–36,880,866
SAFE Investment Co. Ltd.	79,391,075	–40,778,705
Credit Suisse Group AG	76,006,603	67,504,628
Amundi Asset Management SAS	59,979,002	29,007,923
Schroder Investment Management Ltd.	52,274,489	–12,756,446
Royal London Asset Management Ltd.	50,178,021	18,189,456
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP	49,780,577	11,436,446
Northern Trust Global Investments	49,589,195	28,321,565
GIC Pte. Ltd.	45,785,696	40,588,329
Fisher Asset Management LLC	45,056,631	44,778,845
BNY Asset Management	44,757,838	20,731,031
Total	2,460,964,330	577,393,728

Whilst some in the top 20 of each company have increased and some have decreased their shareholding, there has been a significant net increase in both companies (of over three quarters of a million shares by the BP top 20 and over half a billion shares by the Shell top 20).

Expressed as a percentage of overall ownership, the proportion of shareholding held by the top 20 BP shareholders has risen from 31.5% to 38.2%, and of Shell shareholders, from 27.6% to 35.1% between 31st December 2015 and 31st December 2022.

As *Carbon Cash Machine* noted, the top three shareholders in both BP and Shell are the same investment firms: BlackRock, Vanguard and the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, Norges Bank Investment Management. Together this group of 'mega' shareholders own more than 17% of BP and almost 16% of Shell. Indeed, the top three mega shareholders have increased the proportion of their collective holding of BP from 11.5% to 17.7%. The same mega share-holders have increased the proportion of their collective holding of Shell from 13.1% to 15.9%.

The final sections in this report analyses patterns in divestment amongst the minority of shareholders who have reduced their investment.

4. DIVESTORS

A total of 47% of BP shareholders and 54% of Shell shareholder have sold a proportion of their shares since the Paris Agreement was signed.

Tables 8 and 9 provide a snapshot of the largest divestors in each company. The groups represented in these tables are entirely comprised of 'partial divestors'. That is, they all retain some proportion of their shareholding. Within those groups, a small handful have retained a negligible proportion of their shares, amounting to less than 1% of their shares (three shareholders in BP and two in Shell).

Table 8: BP largest 20 divestors by number of shares

BP Shareholder	No. of BP shares sold since 2015	Shareholder rank 2015	Shares owned 31st Dec 2022	Shareholder rank 2022	BP share movement	Shell share movement
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd.	400,314,919	2	249,211,259	10	-62%	-43%
Invesco Ltd.	272,878,594	31	91,210,324	31	-75%	-71%
Kuwait Investment Authority	241,779,654	10	86,364,138	33	-74%	+242%
UBS Asset Management AG	221,533,262	3	385,683,597	4	-36%	+66%
M&G Investment Management Ltd.	164,255,219	11	116,265,415	22	-59%	-79%
SAFE Investment Co. Ltd.	129,224,741	7	254,282,821	9	-34%	-34%
Capital Research & Mgmt Co.	113,094,836	6	290,715,716	7	-28%	-93%
State Street Global Advisors Inc.	97,406,192	4	359,406,811	5	-21%	-45%
State Street Global Advisors Ltd.	84,486,718	12	102,746,441	26	-45%	-5%
Federated Hermes, Inc.	84,012,532	28	140,482,833	833	-99.8%[14]	-96%
AXA Investment Managers SA	82,632,687	50	51,801,536	50	-61%	-82%
Pzena Investment Management Inc.	67,095,073	29	9,725,642	161	-87%	-15%
Allianz Asset Management GmbH	66,195,462	20	48,156,303	52	-58%	-96%
The **Toronto-Dominion** Bank	61,273,648	41	35,052	1352	-99.9%	-99.7%
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP	51,806,004	14	114,998,075	23	-31%	+30%
Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo & Co. LLC	48,172,626	25	45,340,308	56	-52%	-80%
Credit Suisse Group AG	46,060,524	21	57,744,290	47	-44%	+794%
Deutsche Bank AG	40,531,105	36	24,045,069	90	-63%	-37%
Brandywine Global Investment Management LLC	33,483,204	51	12,853,776	131	-72%	+31%
American Beacon Advisors Inc.	28,866,389	73	296,641	665	-69%	-69%

14. Percentages representing more than 99% are expressed with one decimal place.

Table 9: Shell largest 20 divestors by number of shares

Shell Shareholder	No. of Shell shares sold since 2015	Shareholder rank 2015	Shares owned 31st Dec 2022	Shareholder rank 2022	Shell share movement	BP share movement
Capital Research & Mgmt Co.	382,149,702	2	28,470,555	33	–93%	–28%
Franklin Resources Inc.	245,346,033	3	26,521,642	44	–90%	–99%
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd.	87,202,850	5	117,907,969	6	–43%	–62%
State Street Global Advisors Inc.	78,270,657	6	95,847,741	8	–45%	–21%
Allianz Asset Management GmbH	77,161,150	11	3,366,113	176	–96%	–58%
T. Rowe Price Group Inc.	75,268,606	9	21,503,75	50	–78%	+3%
Invesco Ltd.	68,159,448	10	27,341,464	296	–71%	–75%
Columbia Management Investment Advisers LLC	47,385,494	13	47,385,494	51	–70%	+5%
SAFE Investment Co. Ltd.	40,778,705	8	79,391,075	11	–34%	–34%
BNP Paribas SA	39,632,599	18	13,491,853	67	–75%	+12%
Barclays PLC	37,671,605	19	11,000,584	79	–77%	–83%
M&G Investment Management Ltd.	37,568,991	20	9,943,018	86	–79%	–59%
AXA Investment Managers SA	22,285,266	28	4,868,399	139	–82%	–61
Dodge & Cox	20,674,672	38	129,292,592	592	–99%	n/a[15]
Fidelity International Ltd.	20,417,651	21	26,554,436	43	–43%	+95%
Mondrian Investment Partners Ltd.	17,792,763	31	862,528	97	–69%	+8%
Aviva Investors Global Services Ltd.	17,739,412	16	43,587,969	21	–29%	+29%
Artemis Investment Management LLP	16,981,312	40	450,000	172	–83%	–0.4%[16]
Federated Hermes, Inc.	16,840,827	44	668,042	360	–96%	–99.8%
The **Toronto-Dominion** Bank	16,738,432	46	54,846	789	–99.7%	–99.9%

As Tables 8 and 9 indicate, the largest divestors tend to be relatively high-ranked shareholders. A total of fifteen BP shareholders in Table 9 are placed in the top 100 shareholders in the company; and ten are placed in the top 50. A total of thirteen Shell shareholders in table twelve are placed in the top 100; and eight are placed in the top 50.

15. 'n/a' denotes that this shareholder owned no shares in BP between 2015 and 2022.
16. Percentages representing less than 1% are expressed with one decimal place.

The vast majority of those companies remain significant shareholders, albeit with a reduced shareholding (18/20 in BP and 19/20 in Shell). A total of nine companies listed in Tables 10 and 11 remain significant shareholders in *both* BP and Shell. Indeed, some of those divestors remain ranked in the top 10 of each company. In BP, UBS Asset Management AG, SAFE Investment Co. Ltd., Capital Research & Mgmt Co. and State Street Global Advisors Inc. all appear as major divestors, but they remain in the top 10 shareholders in the company. Similarly, in Shell, two of the biggest divestors, Legal & General Investment Management Ltd. and State Street Global Advisors Inc. remain in the top 10 shareholders in the company.

We should be wary of over-simplifying the motivations of those divestors. Their ongoing status as major fossil fuel investors indicates that any reduction in investment is part of a more complex commercial investment strategy which retains fossil fuels at the heart of their portfolio. Most of the shareholders in Tables 9 and 10 above are clearly not divesting out of an attempt to move out of fossil fuel investments. More than a quarter of those shareholders have increased their holding in the 'other' company. Thus, five of BP's biggest divestors have increased their shareholding in Shell, and seven of Shell's biggest divestors have increased their shareholding in BP.

Table 10 sets out two types of divestors: those that have partially sold their shareholding (partial divestors) and those that have sold all of their shareholding (full divestors).

Table 10: BP and Shell divestors[17]

Company	Partial divestors	Partial divestors as % of total	Total divestors	Total divestors as % of total
BP	341	44%	24	3%
Shell	451	50%	36	4%

As Table 10 shows, only 60 investors in our sample have sold *all* of their shares in the two oil firms. This represents 3% of BP and 4% of Shell institutional shareholders.

Those total divestors are not particularly big players. Within this group only three in BP and were top 100 shareholders before they divested; none of BP's total divestors were in the top 100 shareholder ranking. Only five total divestors in each company were in the top 200.

The analysis presented here alerts us to the fact that any trends towards divestment have not been significant enough to threaten the flow of investment into either BP or Shell.

17. In this table, all shareholders that still held a negligible proportion of their shares in December 2022 (defined as less than 99% of the original holding in December 2015) have been included under the heading 'total divestors.'

5. CONCLUSION

The fossil fuel industry remains gripped in an extended boom period. As we noted in *Carbon Cash Machine*, those trends are part of a wider trend towards 'asset management capitalism'.[18] And the dominant form of investment is passive. In other words, investment is automated, and follows pre-set criteria, such as a stock market index. In this context, it becomes more difficult to see whether investment patterns are responding to external demands or to pre-determined criteria.

Investment in BP and Shell has risen significantly since the Paris Agreement was signed, driven by a relatively small number of aggressive carbon profiteers at the top of the shareholder ranks.

At the same time, half of the Shell shareholders and almost half of the BP shareholders that held shares when the Paris Agreement was signed have reduced their shareholding since then. However, there is no reason to believe that those patterns are driven by environmental or social concerns, since a large majority of those 'divestors' have retained significant investments in BP and Shell. It is only a relatively small number of institutional shareholders (3% of BP and 4% of Shell) that have *completely* divested since 2015. Moreover, those small groups of *total* divestors are all fairly low-ranked shareholders.

The data analysed here indicates very strongly that shareholder movements in BP and Shell are not applying the pressure necessary to cease oil and gas development. Indeed, if there is any discernible effect, it is that shares are being pushed into the hands of a few very powerful asset management companies. This report illustrates a process of shareholder substitution that has allowed some big players to significantly increase their shareholding; even if there were an army of companies ready to completely divest, there is an even bigger army of BlackRocks, Vanguards and Norges Banks ready to replace any divested funds.

On this basis, divestment is not divestment at all: it is reinvestment.

Intermittently, senior managers and directors at both BP and Shell express concern about the impact of divestment pressures. Those concerns may well turn out to be well-founded at some point. But on the evidence of this report, this does not appear to be happening anytime soon. The major fossil fuel companies are much more concerned about "stranded assets." This is the possibility that their assets – in the form of the oil and gas reservoirs they have the rights to explore and develop – may be 'stranded' or 'frozen'. Although this seems like a distant possibility, at the time of writing, a referendum in Ecuador has just voted not to explore for oil in 'Block 43', situated within Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. Block 43 has just become a stranded asset for the Ecuadorian state oil company.

On the evidence presented here, divestment in fossil fuel companies alone will not produce stranded assets. This report therefore raises a more fundamental question about what fossil fuel divestment campaigns could do to move beyond those aims. What would a divestment strategy that actually stopped investment in fossil fuels need to look like?

18. Adrienne Buller and Benjamin Braun (2021) Under new management: Share ownership and the growth of UK asset manager capitalism, London: Common Wealth.

It is clear that the level of divestment needed to mitigate global warming will not be achieved by simply transferring the ownership of shares, unless those shares are acquired by organisations that will keep the fossil fuels in the ground. And even then, this kind of ownership transfer would require an organised hostile takeover on a scale never seen before on any stock exchange. This report raises profound questions about how we can take assets from the private sector and put them in the hands of those that are serious about leaving oil and gas in the ground rather than carbon profiteering.

Drastic conditions require drastic solutions. If a target of limiting global warming to the levels necessary for planetary survival is to be kept within our reach, all of the evidence we have indicates that we need to stop producing oil and gas now. If shareholder divestment is not working fast enough to achieve this – as this report shows – then we need to pursue other forms of intervention that drastically scale back production. If the planet is to have a fighting chance of survival, oil and gas assets must be decommissioned, and removed from the reach of predatory investors now.